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It is assumed that Military Assistance will continue to be a
major foreign policy mechanism utilized by this country in promoting
national interest. The large number and the dynamic nature of the
programs now in being, and the high probability that new programs
will be required in the near future, suggest that a detailed analysis
of a model program would aid in understanding the value, potential,
and problems of this activity. South Korea was chosen as the case
study because it has received military assistance for several years,
there is a viable threat to its security which acts as a stimulant
to the program, the effectiveness of the forces has been tested in
actual military operations, and because of personal experience with
this particular program.
Chapter I
In this chapter the United States/South Korean dialogue following
the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine is reviewed. The reaction and
mood of South Korea is revealed through selected quotes of various
national leaders. The development and nature of the compromise
U.S. force reduction program is included.
Chapter II
This chapter includes overviews of the three main force-elements
which are integral to the development of the Military Assistance Plan
in this area. These include the South Korean military forces, the
U.S./U.S. forces maintained in country, and the North Korean forces
who represent a direct threat to the security of the country.
Chapter III
A historical development of the U.S. Foreign Aid and Military
Assistance programs and, im particular, those which are operative in
South Korea is presented. The current varieties of military assistance
are also discussed including a detailed analysis of the methods and
techniques of military assistance planning and programming.
Chapter IV
A detailed discussion of the South Korean assistance programs
including the political, economic, and military aspects is presented.
An attempt is made to evaluate the effectiveness of the program by
reviewing the performance record of the South Koreans in Vietnam and
in reacting to the INZ violations and infiltrations of North Korea.
Chapter V
Areas other than purely operational which affect the effectiveness
of the South Korean military are discussed. The broad subject of
military support is reviewed in detail as it represents the most limiting
facet of the South Korean forces, and. as such provides indicators of
how future MAP planning should be directed. The role of the military
advisor is also discussed.
Chapter VI
This chapter consist of conclusions and recommendations concerning
the value of the South Korean MAP as a model for future Military
Assistance programs. Strengths and weaknesses discussed and the judgments
offered are based on the data researched and on personal experiences
in the field.
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In 1969 President Nixon, in a major policy address delivered on
the Island of Guam, outlined what has come to be known as the Nixon
Doctrine. While the President carefully reassured his audience that
this country would maintain its interest and commitments in Asia, he
also expressed his belief that some Asian countries are now in a posi-
tion to assume a larger share of the responsibility for the security
of the area. Although the Nixon Doctrine deals with many facets of
Asian policy nuch of its emphasis is directed to the status of mili-
tary forces, both U.S. and indigenous. The doctrine calls for a re-
trenchment of conventional United States forces, phased so that they
will be replaced by properly trained and equipped local forces. The
President and other government officials have stated that the Military
Assistance Program will be one of the vehicles used to bring about
this more cooperative security environment. In light of this new
emphasis, the purpose of this study is to examine Military Assistance
within the context of one of the countries most affected by the
Nixon Doctrine - South Korea.
South Korea was chosen for several reasons: It is one of the
countries where the Nixon Doctrine has had imediate impact and where
there has been a variety of reaction; because South Korea has had a
large and active Military Assistance Program for several years and
there is unclassified documentation available; because South Korea has
a real threat to its security represented by North Korea and this
threat is vividly dramatized on practically a daily basis; because
several unique situations exist in South Korea which bear directly and
indirectly on the Military Assistance Program; and finally because of
a personal interest in this particular area evolving from a recent
assignment as a Military Advisor to the South Korean Air Force.
In organizing my research I attempted to isolate the following
factors: 1) the direction that the Nixon Doctrine would drive the
U.S./South Korea situation; 2) the extent that North Korea represents
a viable threat to the security of South Korea, and the extent and
direction that the threat is exercised; 3) documentation that would
support arguments for or against the effectiveness of South Korean
Armed Forces in various modes of military activity; 4) specifics
about the evolution and character of the South Korean Military Assis-
tance Program, and 5) commentary concerning the major component parts
of the South Korean MAP.
Because of the constraints of Security Classifications, and limi-
ted time and research material, it was not possible to support some
of the assumptions and observations made, which are based primarily
on personal experience. In fact, commentary in the area of support
capability and analysis, with the exception of training, is conspicu-
ous by its absence. To have questioned more deeply into the support
area would require access to material not available outside of the
logistics channels of the U.S. Military Services.
The basic intent of this study can be summarized in the following
manner. The Nixon Doctrine calls for Asian nations to carry a greater
share of their defense while our share of the Asian Security responsi-
bility calls for greater emphasis on Military Assistance Programs. If
one assumes, as in the case of South Korea, that the American forces
being withdrawn were originally sent to help counter the threat from
North Korea, then it follows that the Administration feels that the South
9
Korean Armed Forces are capable of filling the void. Since the program
most responsible for the condition of South Korean Armed Forces is the
Military Assistance Program, it would be useful to identify those facets
of the program which have been successful and, if possible, those which
have not, so that the future programming of Military Assistance Aid
might profit from the Korean experience.
CIAPTER I
THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND SOUTH KOREA
Because the Nixon Doctrine represents a major shift in U.S. Foreign
Policy it has been the focus of a great deal of concern in this country
as well as in those Asian countries which are directly involved.
President Nixon summarized the essence of the Doctrine in his 1970
Report to Congress in the following way:
The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.
We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens
the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation
whose survival we consider vital to our security and
the security of the region as a whole.
In cases involving other types of aggression we shall
furnish military and economic assistance when request-
ed and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation
directly threatened to assume the primary rysponsibility
of providing the manpower for its defense.
lie further amplified the above points by carefully emphasizing that
this new policy
.... requires our commitment to helping our partners
develop their own strength. In doing so we must
strike a careful balance. If we do too little to
help them - and erode their belief in our commitments -
they may lose the necessary will to conduct their
own self-defense or become disheartened about
prospects of development. Yet if we do too much, and
American forces do what local forces can and should
be doing, we promote dependence rather than ins
dependence.
In providing for a more responsible role for
Asian nations in their own defense, the Nixon Doctrine
means not only a more effective use of common resources,
but also an American policy 1hich can best be
sustained over the long run.
The implementation of the Nixon Doctrine from its announcement
to the point where there has been actual restructuring of Military
forces in affected Asian countries has been relatively swift. In Korea,
the implementation has not only been rapid, but it has also been attend-
ed by a variety of reactions ranging from the threatened resignation
of high government officials to the final acceptance of a compromise
American troop reduction plan, the first since the Korean War.
In July 1970 the Pentagon announced that 20,000 American ground
troops would be withdrawn from South Korea by mid - 1971. However, this
announcement had been preceded by a period of intense negotiation
because of the violent objection among Korean officials. President
Chung Hee Park and Prime Minister Chung S1 Kwon berated the U.S. for
the decision and the Prime Minister actually threatened to resign if
the U.S. did not agree to delay the withdrawal until 1976 and pledge
$ 1 billion in military aid spread over the five year period.3
Following the initial announcement and its attendant turmoil in
South Korea, President Nixon and several top administration spokesmen
launched a campaign designed to explain the basic intent of the
Doctrine with particular emphasis on reasuring the South Koreans. For
instance, in an interview on the American Broadcasting Company's
television and radio program "Issues and Answers" on January 18, 1970
Secretary of State Rogers,responding to a question about the country's
position towards our existing defense commitment, stated:
.... I think that is a question in the minds of many
Asians. I believe though, as a result of the trips by
President Nixon, Vice President Agnew, and myself that
we have tended to put their minds at ease. We can live
up to our treaty responsibilities and still reduce our
presence in Asia, and we are reducing our presence in
Asia; and I think we have assured them to their satis-
faction that we mean it4 We are going to live up to
our treaty obligations.
Responding to specific questions about the situation in South Korea,
Secretary Rogers added:
.... we don't have any present plans to reduce our
troops in South Korea, but undoubtedly the troops
will be gradually reduced over a period of years.
Now, that will be a decis on the President has to
make down the road a bit. But of course it does;
it means we will gradually reduce our troop
strength in some of these areas depending on the
circumstances... We certainly have no intention of
forever having troops in South Korea, but I wouldn't
want to suggest we are going to take all of our
troops out of South Korea in the foreseeable future
as long as North Korea behaves the way they do.
At a press conference in July of 1970 Secretary Rogers again
addressed himself to the South Korean situation, specifically to
the threat of the Prime Minister that he and his staff would resign
if the United States did not take measures to modernize the South
Korean Army before any withdrawals were made. His reply indicated
that several meetings had been held with the Foreign inister of
South Korea and assurances had been repeated by this government that
we would do what we could to modernize their forces to fill the
vacuum caused by U.S. troops withdrawals. He added that:
I think that they regret the decision, but I think
that they realize that we are going to cooperate with
then. We have reiterated that this is not in any way
a lack of resolve on our part to live up to our treaty
commitments, and we will do what we can to reassure
them and to make it clear to the other side that we are
going to remain strong and that the forces ?f the
Republic of South Korea will remain strong. "
Vice President Agnew was also called upon to reassure the
Koreans and he included a visit to Seoul in the itinerary of his
Asian tour in mid 1970. The report of his Korean visit contains
some indication of how the negotiations between the United States
and South Korea were progressing. le repeatedly reaffirmed our
government's intent to honor the 'utual Defense Treaty, but also
made it quite clear that American ground forces would be reduced.
However, he did announce that a squadron of F-4 tactical fighter
aircraft would be permanently stationed in Korea and that, as a
counter to increased North Korean attempts to infiltrate from the
sea, special radar equipped patrol aircraft would be made available
to the South Korean Navy. He further stated that
I am here to assure you that in connection with our
commitment to Korea, the United States intends to
provide your Government with additional military
assistance to substantially modernize the defense ca-
pability of your military. 8
Statements made by Prime Minister Il Kwon Chung indicate that
by this time the South Koreans were becoming resigned to the
situation, and were satisfied that they were not being abandoned by
the United States.
Vice President Agnew in a press briefing after having left Seoul.
admitted that a basic accord had been reached with the Koreans, but
reaffirmed that the U.S. takes the position that the reduction is
not contingent upon the modernization, nor is modernization contingent
upon reduction.9
In a message to Congress delivered on November 18, 1970 President
Nixon requested a supplemental appropriation of economic and military
assistance funds required because of the impact of the Nixon Doctrine,
His comments concerning the Korean situation indicated in general
terms the nature of the agreements between the two countries. He said:
I have announced our intentions to reduce by 20,000 the
authorized level of United States forces in the Republic
of Korea. This has placed a greater defense burden on
the Koreans.
Our present assistance to Korea is mostly of operations-
and-maintenance items for their military forces. These
items do not help to modernize the Korean force structure
as we must do if we are to help Korea improve its own de-
fense capability.
I therefore request authority to transfer to Korea
equipment currently being utilized by United States forces
scheduled to be withdrawn.
Additional assistance is required this year as part
of Korea's major five-year program to modernize its
defense forces and to enable it to effectively meet out-
side threats as we reduce the level of direct U.S.
involvement. These funds are needed now to insure that
the needed equipment will be delivered in good time.
I request that Congress provide 150 million dollars
in suppofb of this modernization of South Korea's
defense.
The impact of the Nixon Doctrine on South Korea now seems to have
stabilized. The violent objections with which the Korean Government
initially reacted have calmed and troop realignments have begun.
The compromise which has mollified the Koreans includes: no with-
drawals beyond the announced 20,000 men, the turnover of about $100
million worth of surplus United States military equipment which will
be left behind by the returning troops, an additional $150 million
of Military Assistance for the modernization of the Korean Armed
Forces in addition to the regular military aid amounting to $140 million
approved for this year, and the relocation of a tactical fighter wing
from Japan to Korea. 11
Examples of news releases from Korea are indicators of the
rapid pace that the military force structure is changing:
After 18 years troops of the U.S. Second Infantry Division are
being withdrawn from an 18 mile sector of the Korean Demilitarized
Zone. 12
An Air Force Wing of 54 F-4D Phantom fighter bombers has been
permanently transferred to Kunson Air Base, 120 miles south of Seoul,
from Japan. 1 3
The South Korean Government is considering the possibility of
withdrawing the 50,000 South Korean troops now stationed in South
Vietnam, and also increasing the size of the defense forces in order
to offset the U.S. troop withdrawals. 1 4
Considering the intent of the Nixon Doctrine as described above,
the context of the negotiated agreement between this government and
South Korea, and actual conditions as they presently exist in South
Korea today, it appears that the security of the area rests upon two
pillars. The first consists of the South Korean military establish-
ment bolstered by a large military assistance and advisory program.
The second is implied in the pledge contained in the Mutual Defense
Treaty, dynamically dramatized by the presence of a large U.S. force
permanently stationed in South Korea. The Military Assistance Program
affects and is affected by both of these major factors, and the whole
force structure package is carefully tailored to the most immediate
threat, North Korea. In order to place the military assistance
program as it operates in South Korea in the proper perspective it
is necessary to briefly review these three major force elements.
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CHAPTER II
FORCE ELEMENTS
SOUTH KOREA
On the 5th of June 1950, when the Communist forces moved south
across the 38th parallel with armor, heavy artillery and tactical air-
craft, the ROK Army of 94,000 officers and men consisted of 8 under-
strength and poorly trained divisions and two separate regiments.
Training during the preceding year had progressed only to the point
where each soldier had fired a qualification course with his individual
weapon, and only two regiments had completed the battalion phase of
unit training.
The ROK Air Force consisted of twelve L-4 and L-5 type airplanes
which had been furnished by the United States for liaison and artillery
use, and ten AT-6 training ships purchased by the Korean Government.
The Navy consted of a skeleton Coast Guard and one Marine regiment.
There was no field army or corps organizations and comand and
control could only be directed by ROK Headquarters.1
Today the military establishment of the Republic of Korea is the
second largest military force in the Far East, exceeded only by Communist
China. The armed forces have a total personnel strength of about
670,000 which includes an Army of 570,000, an Air Force of 23,000, a
Navy of 50,000 and a Marine Corps of 33,000.2
The Army presently consists of 19 front line infantry divisions
organized into the First Army deployed along the demilitarized zone
dividing North and South Korea, and the Second Army made up of four
military district commands and tasked primarily with the administration
and training of the reserve force and recruits. 3  Most of the Army's
equipment is of U.S. origin and consists of modern hardware such as
M-48 tanks, M-79 grenade launches, and integrated military communications
networks. There is one battalion of "Honest John" rockets, two squadrons
with "Hawk" surface-to-air missiles, and one battalion of "Nike-Hercules"
surface-to-air missiles.4 The total number of South Korean anti-air-
craft missiles is reported to be 80.5
This equipment list is in the process of dynamic change as the U.S.
forces, withdrawing from their positions on the IZ, turn over their
equipment to their South Korean replacements.
The ROK Army has maintained a sizeable force in Vietman since 1964.
Besides compiling an impressive combat record, the Korean army has
profited from the Vietnam experience in that through the rotation of
troops in Vietnam they have exposed and trained their cadre in modern
combat techniques against an enemy equipped and trained much the same
as the one they face in North Korea. The Vietnam situation will be more
fully developed later.
The Chief of Staff of the Army commands all components of the Army,
however, operational control of the field army, corps, division and
AAA Brigade is exercised by the Commanding General 8th U.S. Army.
Training in the ROK Army is conducted at one Replacement Training
Center, 19 Service Schools including a Command and General Staff
College, and the Korean Military Academy.
There are Korean Military Assistance Group detachments at each of
the major POKA commands and at other echelons down to and including the
Corps and certain Military Districts.6
The ROK Navy is mainly limited, because of its small size, to
coastal patrol, mine sweeping and limited amphibious operations.
Recently expanded to a total strength of 50,000 because of the
increased threat of North Korean infiltration by sea approaches, the
Navy command and control structure consist of a fleet command, two
combat groups, two independent squadrons, and a training group. They
operate 3 destroyers, 4 destroyer escorts, 4 frigates,15 coastal escorts,
3 fast transports, 11 coastal mine sweepers, 8 tank landing ships,
12 medium landing ships and 12 other ships. 7
Most of the officer personnel are procured from the Naval Academy,
which conducts a four year course of instruction. In addition to these,
and a number of officers obtained from the Merchant Marine Academy, a
few are obtained from civilian universities and given 12 to 16 weeks
course prior to commissioning. There is also a Naval War College for
senior Navy officers. 8
The ROK Marine Corps is subordinated to the Navy, and consists of
five brigades, with one, the 2nd "Blue Dragon" brigade, serving in
Vietnam. The remaining brigades are tasked with the defense of the
capital and the security of the islands off the west coast of Korea.
Its equipment is modern and ROK marines are unusually well trained
and motivated.
The ROK Air Force is the newest of the services, organized in
May, 1948, as the Korean Air Base Group. It has a total strength of
23,000 and an equipment list consisting of 200 combat aircraft including
55 F-5 tactical fighters, 20 F-86D all weather interceptors armed with
sidewinder missiles, 100 F-86F interceptors, 10 RF-86F reconnaissance
aircraft, 29 C-46 and Aero Commander transports, 3 C-54 transports
used in support of the Vietnam forces, T-33 and T-28 trainers and some
Checkasaw and HU-1 helicopters used for liaison, counter-insurgency and
priority material handling in support of remote operating locations.
The Air Force also operates an aircraft control and warning network,
and a modern microwave and tropo-scatter communications network.9 The
U.S. Air Force Military Assistance and Advisory Group is completing the
F-4 tactical fighter modernization program. A squadron of 15 of these
aircraft was provided to the South Korean Air Force in order to bolster
the defense against the MG-21's operated by North Korea. 10
The Chief of Staff of the ROK Air Force has full operational
control, his post corresponding closely to that of the Chief of Staff
of the USAF. His relationship with the chiefs of the ROK Amy and the
CNO are comparable to those of the U.S. services. Officers are obtained
from the Air Force Academy and through Officer Candidate Schools for
qualified college graduates. The 6146th Air Force Advisory group USAF
provides advisors at all echelons from headquarters ROKAF down to
Squadron level.
In addition to their obvious utility as indicators of military
potential, the above lists of military hardware and, even to a greater
degree the highly specialized and modern equipment being transfered by
the departing U.S. troops to their Korean replacements draw attention
to the sophistication of the force. Equipment of this type places a
heavy premium on maintenance, supply and training facilities, and this
in direct proportion to the overall effectiveness of the Military.
Since the South Korean military establishment is a technologically
advanced military force it must provide the proper operations and
training programs to its personnel. This is done both in country and
outside as, either a feature of the military assistance program, or in
a third country as a function of mutual defense agreements.
To use the Air Force as an example, the ROKAF training Command
provides modem facilities for basic training and skill development.
These facilities are modeled after USAF facilities and use much of the
same training and course material. Instruction is provided in a
variety of areas including air operations, basic flying instruction,
aircraft maintenance, air traffic control, photographic interpretation,
communications equipment operations and maintenance, and supply ad-
ministration.12 Graduates of these centers are then exposed to on-the-
job training at operational units until testing and performance indi-
cates they are competent. In addition, instructors at these centers,
and key supervisory NCO's receive training through the Military As-
sistance Program. Thousands of Korean military personnel have re-
ceived training since the program was established. Selection for this
training is competitive and opportunities are provided for language
training centers.
Third country training, utilized when it becomes economically
expedient to provide special training for a large number of personnel
without consuming funds for travel to the continental U.S., is pos-
sible because many Asian countires have received similar equipment
through the Military Assistance Program.
Special courses on this equipment, or on procedures and tactics
common to these countries can easily be organized using specially
trained instructors or mobile training teams from the United States.
Another dimension of the training program will be treated in a later
chapter.
NORTH KOREA
The modern Korean People's Army was formally established on
February 8, 1948. At the ceremony marking the foundation of the Army,
Kim II - Sung reminided the nation of "...the task of strengthening
military discipline, educating the soldiers in bravery and heroism
and mastering Soviet military science, and the valuable combat ex-
perience of the Soviet Armed Forces." 13 This task has been one of the
central goals of the country since that time and at present the North
Korean Military force is estimated to total approximately 400,000 in-
cluding an Army of some 360,000, an Air Force of over 800 aircraft,
and 30,000 men, a Navy with a defensive coastal fleet of about 160
small craft and 10,000 men. The regular forces are augmented by a
civilian militia with a claimed strength of 1,200,000 making the size
of the military establishment surpassed only by those of the Soviet
Union and Comunist China among the Communist Nations. 14
In structure and equipment the North Korean military is patterned
after the two major communist powers. The equipment used by all
services is mostly of Russian manufacture and obtained through various
foreign aid programs.
The Army has an estimated total strength of 360,000 men organized
into 1 amoured division and 18 infantry divisions. There are also
5 independent infantry brigades. The Army is equipped with 800 Soviet
tanks including PT-76's, T-34's, T-54's, and T-55's, 200 Su-76's, Su-100
and Su-57 self-propelled guns, and 5000 other artillery pieces up to
152 mm guns. They also have 15 SA-20 "guideline" surface-to-air
missile sites with about 300 missiles. There are about 15,000 men in
"special commando teams" who specialize in clandestine and insurgency
activities. Members of this group carried out the attempted assassination
of South Korean President Park in 1968.15
The North Korean Navy with a total strength of 10,000 operates
4 Soviet W class submarines, 10 fleet mine sweepers, 14 coastal escorts,
4 missile patrol boats, 21 motor torpedo boats (less than 100 tons),
30 other small patrol boats and one slightly used U.S. intelligence
boat.16
The Air Force derives its main strength from its more than 590 combat
aircraft. These include 30 MiG-21 interceptors, 60 11-28 jet light-
bombers, 50 MiG-19 interceptors, 450 MiG-17 and MiG-15 fighter bombers.
They also operate 27 AN-2 and Li-2 transports, with 20 Mi-4 helicopters.
Yak-9, Yak-11, Yak-18, MiG-15 and 11-28 are used for pilot and crew
. . 17training.
Recently the South Korean Defense Minister announced in an interview
that he had reason to believe that there were some MiG-23 aircraft in
North Korea. 1 8
The para-military, territorial militia is now reported to be over
the million personnel mark and appears to be a formidable factor for
domestic discipline and for organized wartime support. The Militia is
composed of men and women including factory workers, farmers, intellect-
uals and others from all walks of life. Its members are organized into
regiments composed of about 12 companies formed in factories, villages,
cooperatives, and schools, and are sponsored and supervised by one of
the Regular Army groups and by the Party as well. 1 9
North Korea is also reported to have 19 factories capable of
producing 73 million small-arms rounds, 6.5 million hand grenades,
650,000 artillery rounds, 14,000 tons of explosives, 150,000 rifles and
300 mortars a year.20
The bulk of enlisted personnel for the services are conscripted
youth who are trained and administered by the relatively permanent
cadre. Normal service is 3 years and six months for those in the Army
and 4 years for the Navy and Air Force. Enlisted personnel may be
discharged at any time for a variety of reasons including medical,
ideological, and political. A vocational placement and guidance program
is provided following discharge.
Officers receive their commissions via their individual services
Officer Candidate Schools, or as graduates of the cademies. Some
officers have risen from the ranks. There does not appear to be any
favored or elite class dominating the officer ranks. 21
Training in the North Korean Military has been tempered by both
Soviet and Chinese advisory teams. Several training sites have been
established including a military school system for the basic and
advanced training of officers and enlisted men. Judging from the
sophistication and advanced technology of the equipment operated
and maintained, and by the appearance and performance of units in
parades and demonstrations it appears that the training program is
quite successful.
As in all communist military establishments political training
plays a major role in the development of personnel. Recruits find
that the Party's indoctrination program is vigorously enforced and
future promotion depends on successfully meeting political training
goals.
A unique feature of the training system is the military
instruction conducted at all colleges and universities. It is
compulsory for all male students to undergo 200 hours of training
each year in addition to his regular academic work. The military
subjects are taught by active duty officers and students must pass
their military subjects before they are allowed to take examinations
in their academic subjects and those who fail, leave school. 22
Recently, because of reduced Soviet aid and Kim Il-Sung's added
emphasis on military preparedness, the cost of maintaining the military
absorbs a major portion of the national economy. Defense outlays for
calendar year 1967 were raised sharply to 30.2 percent of the budget.
In April 1968 a Cabinet minister announced an additional increase to
33 percent for military expenditures. 23
The announced intention of Kim Il-Sung to re-unify the country before
his 60th birthday with its attendant expanded program of INZ violations
and attempted infiltration of agents into South Korea has placed
additional demands on the Military which will result in higher cost.
There is also reason to believe that new problems requiring expanded
military involvement are developing on the Chinese border. It was
recently reported in an Indian newspaper that because of clashes along
the 600 mile border between Manchuria and North Korea the Chinese have
sealed the border. China has claimed a large strip of North Korea
which includes a heavily guarded military zone defended by surface-
to-air missiles, on the strength of its intervention in the Korea
War. 24
Since 1966 when it was decided to change the character of the economy
and give greater attention to military preparedness, the role of the
military in politics, has greatly expanded. Many officers hold key
positions in both the Korean Workers Party and in the government.
Most of the individuals who reach positions of power are those who have
been closely associated with Premier Kim Il-Sung since WI IT and who
survived the purges following the Korean War. Until 1959 there was a
dual political - military structure, of the model common in most
communist countries. This system, because it caused conflicts between
the professional military components, and the "political commissar"
was reformed in order to tighten the party control over the military,
A series of Party Committees and corresponding political offices
have been established at all levels of command and is responsible for
accommodating the political needs of the troops. The reorganization
has also led to the expedient of combining the political and military
functions in the same, properly conditioned officer.
U.S. FORCES
The third major element involved in the total military posture in
the area are the U.S. military forces permanently stationed in South
Korea. In spite of the announced withdrawal of 20,000 men, the U.S.
contingent is still a large force capable of quick reaction. Current
plans call for the retrenchment of U.S. troops from the forward positions
they have manned on the western end of the DaZ, to reserve position in
the interior of the country. This will result in the disbanding of
the U.S. 7th Infantry Division. After this reorganization, U.S. Forces
in Korea will stabilize at about 43,000 Army personnel, assigned to the
2nd Infantry Division, the Headquarter Staff of the 8th U.S. Army, and
various air defense, maintenance, and medical support organizations.
The recently assigned F-4E fighter wing will bolster USAF forces
under the command of the 314th Air Division. Other Air Force units in
country are tasked with air control and warning missions, and other
tactical control functions.
Not included above are the Military Assistance Groups which will be
covered later.
Although the U.S. forces in Korea and those on call in the immediate
area are a substantial element in the total security equation there
are, however, other relationships in the interface of South Korean and
U.S. forces more germane to the basic concern of this study in that
they bear directly on the effectiveness of the Military Assistance
Program.
Perhsps the most significant of these second order relationships is
the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army Program (KATUSA).
This program involves the assignment and integration of the Republic
of Korea Army (ROKA) enlisted personnel into units of the Eighth U.S.
Army. It has two basic purposes:
(1) Increasing the operating capability of the U.S. Army units
to which these ROKA personnel "KATUSAs" are assigned.
(2) Providing additional well-trained personnel and skilled
technicians for ROKA.
The program of augmenting U.S. military units with Korean troops
began in 1950 as a field expedient. Today, it is a program of inter-
national cooperation through which extremely important contributions
are made to the separate and collective needs of the U.S. and ROK
Armies. The program permits the U.S. Army to maintain units of full
strength and operating capability and, simultaneously, helps reduce
the cost to the U.S. both in money and in manpower. It provides the
U.S. units the tactical advantages that go along with assimilation
of local troops into U.S. ranks. It has also helped to contribute
to the building of an even more powerful allied army, for the Pepublic
of Korea gains by means of this program, well trained personnel who
will return to the ROKA and will be used as highly skilled trainers.
At the same time, ROKA is spared some of the burdens of arming and
supporting these men while they are attached to the U.S. units.
At present there are about 11,000 personnel in the KATUSA. To
be selected an individual must have at least a 6th grade education
and some English language training. Each man selected is provided
a short familiarization program at the KATJSA training center prior
to being assigned to an American unit. There are no commissioned or
warrant officers in this category and KATUSA personnel may not be
assigned permanently as kitchen police, laborers, cargo carriers,
houseboys, or other non-military tasks. This does not prohibit the
rotation of KATUSA personnel, as individuals, to these housekeeping-
or guard and security details, to which American personnel are regu-
larly detailed by unit duty rosters.26 Every effort is made to assim-
ilate these augmentees into units as thoroughly as possible. There
are cases where Korean NCO's are in supervisory positions over lower
ranking U.S. troops; and further, because KATUSA have a permanency
which the short tour length in Korea (13 months) denies Americans,
there are examples where KATUSA's provide high quality on-the-job
training for U.S. troops. This is particularly true in those operational
centers where Korean and U.S. personnel work side by side and the
Koreans, because of their familiarity with the country, language,
and the various contingency plans, dampen the effect of the rapid
turnover of U.S. troops.
Although the training offered the KATUSA should not be equated
with the more formalized effort which is part of the Military Assistance
Program, it does make a major contribution to general effectiveness
of the South Korean forces and thus does parallel the basic intent of
the Assistance Program.
Another spin off from the U.S. military forces in South Korea
which affects the Assistance programs results because the U.S. presence
provides a dynamic model against which the Korean Forces can compare
their activities and even draw upon on occasion. There are many cases,
especially during periods of increased alert such as following the
Pueblo seizure, when the rather slow mechanics of the Military As-
sistance Program could not meet inmediate operational demands. During
these times U.S. in-country maintenance, supply, and logistical re-
sources can be used to supplement the Korean capability. This by-
passes the long procurement lead times required for standard MAP pro-
gramming by drawing on U.S. material and expertise because of over-
riding operational needs.
During joint exercises, ROK units operating side by side with
U.S. units can compare their performance, witness advanced tactics be-
ing demonstrated, and observe how modem military equipment is used --
all in the physical environment that the Korean forces must operate.
This unique characteristic of the Korean situation does have dis-
advantages. Very often inefficiencies in either the Military Assis-
tance Program or in the ROK forces themselves are overlooked or tole-
rated because of the expedient of simply having the "Americans do it".
This is particularly true in the area of supply and logistical support.
Often high value items essential to the proper functioning of sophis-
ticated equipment are not stocked in sufficient numbers because to do
so would deplete funds from the limited resources available. The ra-
tionale justifying this practice being that if conditions deteriorate
to the point where joint operations are affected the U.S. forces will
intercede and by-pass the Assistance channel in order to expedite the
fix.
Another possible negative effect develops whenever Koreans com-
pare their forces with the obviously better equipped U.S. troops and
assume from this a lack of confidence in their own military, and an
overreliance on U.S. forces. This partially explains the violent re-
action described earlier which followed the announcement of U.S.
troop withdrawals from Korea.
The basic reason for presenting this brief overview of the major
forces operating within the area is to dramatize the highly sophisticated
environment within which the Military Assistance Program must operate.
The size of these force elements, the types of equipments they utilize,
and the integrated nature of many of the operations the South Korean
and United States forces participate in to counter the North Korean
threat) provide insights into the magnitude of the M.A.P. The following
discussion will add another dimension to the development of the program.
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CHAPTER III
,FOREIGN AID AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE OVERVIEW
In order to better appreciate and understand the impact of
Military Assistance in South Korea, one must, as a minimum, consider
the general background of the United States Foreign Assistance Program.
Technically, foreign aid can be defined as any contribution made
by one economy on the behalf of another. In this broad sense, all
forms of private investments and commerical trade may be labelled
as foreign aid. Usually, however, the term refers to that aid which
is generated at the governmental level and generally includes economic
as well as military assistance. Therefore, it is adequate to limit
this review to those programs beginning with the Lend Lease of World
War II to appreciate the evolution of the program which now operates
in South Korea, although as an interesting aside, the Korean government
was one of the first governments to request military assistance from
the United States. In correspondence from the then ambassador to Korea,
Lucuis H1. Foote to the Secretary of State dated October 19, 1883 is
quoted an interview with the King of Korea where he requested the
services of an American Military Officer to instruct and drill his
troops. As a reward, he was willing to confer upon the officer the
second highest military rank in the kingdom.1
In a follow-up dispatch dated Sept. 3, 1884 the ambassador again
referred to the request of the King describing the actions taken by
the Korean government in anticipation of the arrival of the U.S.
advisor in the following way:
Fourteen young Koreans educated in the Military
School at Tokio are waiting to assist him and four
thousand stand at arms, - breechloading rifles -
purchased in the U.S., remain by order of his
majesty undistributed until he shall arrive. Men
of other nationalities, through the Officials of
their respective governments are seeking these
positions, and I would earnestl ask you to take
immediate action in the matter.
LEGISLATIVE HIS'ORY
United States post war relief from 1946 to 1948 was given through
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Program (UNRRP) which
supplied emergency food, supplies, shelters, and clothing to Europe.
In 1948 the Economic Cooperation Act (ECA), commonly called the
Marshall Plan, was launched for the reconstruction of western Europe.
The ECA administered aid to Europe on a regional basis, aiming to
increase agricultural and industrial production, eliminate intra-
European trade barriers, reduce the "dollar gap", and achieve
financial stability. The ECA program was later extended to include
economic stabilization and development in non-European areas such
as China, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Burma and the Philippines.
The ECA goals were being accomplished, but, with the threat of Cornunist
aggression in Greece and Turkey, Europe turned from reconstruction
to rearmament.. In 1948 aid was given Greece and Turkey which in-
augurated the postwar U.S. foreign aid program as a vehicle to
counter Soviet aggression using American money and material. The
Defense Assistance Program was initiated in 1949 to aid Europe in
rearming without sacrificing its reconstruction program.
The Mutual Defense Assistance Program CDAP) and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) were established in 1949 as a joint U.S. -
European response to the mounting possibility of Soviet aggression
in Europe. The MDAP helped Europe in rearmament while NATO was a
program of mutual defense with America agreeing to support Europe
militarily if aggression occurred. Military Assistance was extended
to some 40 countries in the Far East, Near East, South Asia, Africa
and Latin America, mostly outside of NATO and Europe.
In 1950 the first Act of Internal Development under the Point IV
Program was passed offering technical skills and knowledge to under-
developed nations. With the outbreak of the Korean War that same
year, the U.S. aid program was restructured into the military oriented
supporting assistance concept. The ECA was terminated and replaced by
the Mutual Security Administration (MSA) in 1951. The MSA also
provided material help and technical advice to hasten the economic
developent of underdeveloped nations with a substantial part of the
economic aid used for defense support.
The Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) was established in
1953 to succeed the MSA and administer all non-military assistance,
along with relieving the State Department of technical assistance
while military assistance remained under the Secretary of Defense.
In 1954 the United States began programs in which surplus
agricultural products were exported by sale or grants to less
developed nations under Public Law 480 which became the Food for Peace
and Freedom Program. The Commodity Credit Corporation made available
surplus agricultural products under Title I, for sale for overseas
currency at current world market prices; Title II, as grants to meet
famine or other relief; and Title III, as donations for volunteer
non-profit agencies and inter-governmental agencies.
It was planned in the Mutual Security Act of 1953 that economic
aid be terminated in two years and military aid in three, however,
the Mutual Security Act of 1954 recognized that some aid might have
to be extended and the International Cooperation Administration (ICA)
was created in 1955. The ICA centralized operations as under the
FOA and was the successor of MSA.
With the formation of the Development Loan Fund in 1957, an
increasing emphasis on long-tenn, low-interest loans replacing grants
took place. This fund made loans for economically sound development
projects in the less-developed countries available when the projects
did not qualify for loans from private sources.
A critical review of our foreign aid program took place in 1961.
Europe had economically recovered from the war, the need for large
scale military assistance was greatly decreased and a new approach
to the problem of conmmunism became necessary along with a new approach
to economic development.
To meet these needed revisions, Congress enacted the Foreign
Assistance Act which enabled the U.S. to improve and adapt new methods
in administering aid. The Agency for International Development (AID)
was established as the central administrator for coordinating economic
assistance. The five points stressing the U.S. shift of emphasis
in the new foreign aid policy were: (1) long-range development
assistance, based on well-conceived plans prepared by the developing
country in cooperation with the U.S., aimed at self-sustaining growth
of that country; (2) ability and willingness on the part of the
developing country to help itself; (3) Aid programs are tailored
to the developing country's capacity to use them effectively and the
existing threat of communism, depending on the situation of the
particular country; (4) long-term, low-interest loans replacing
grants to encourage self-help, with repayment in dollars rather
than local currency; (5) increase the share of other developed
countries in aiding the less-developed countries.
An extensive reorganization of the administrative machinery took
place establishing an administrator who was in charge of four regional
bureaus representing Latin America, Europe and Africa, the Near East
and South Asia and Far East. Supporting offices were created to
handle the different phases of assistance along with a Program Review
and coordination Staff for agency-wide program and policy planning,
economic analysis, and to review and coordinate all AID programs as
well as military assistance activities.
There are two other operations, the Peace Corps and the Export-
Import Bank, which are not a part of the AID organization but are
closely related to it. The Peace Corps, an agency of the Department
of State, supplies volunteer manpower for a "people-to-people" program
to fill the existing gap between technical experts and unskilled
populations of many countries. Loans repayable in dollars for procur-
ement of U.S. goods are made by the Export-Import Bank for projects
that directly earn or create income in the country of the borrower. 3
Other legislative milestones are the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)
1969 which provides the authority for the U.S. to implement its foreign,
economic, and military assistance program in fiscal year 1970. In
his comments during the signing of the Act, President Nixon referred
to upcoming changes in the foreign assistance program through the
efforts of a Task Force which he had recently appointed.
He stated that the Task Force had been instructed to intensively
examine U.S. assistance programs both past and present. The recommend-
ations of the Task Force were submitted to the President on March 8,
1970 by the Chairman Rudolph A. Peterson, President of the Bank of
America. The report concluded, among other things, that changes in
the organization and management of U.S. security programs would
contribute to their effectiveness, clarify their relationship to U.S.
foreign policy, and make our objectives and rationale more understand-
able to the Congress and the American public. Accordingly, the Task
Force recommended: That security assistance programs be combined
in one piece of legislation - an International Security Cooperation
Act - separate from international development assistance. This Act
should cover foreign military sales and grants, surplus military
stocks, supporting assistance, public safety programs, and the
Contingency Fund; that responsibility be assigned to the Department
of State for setting policy and for directing and coordinating security
assistance programs. In carrying out this policy, the State Department
should relate security programs to U.S. foreign policy, to global
strategies, to changing military technologies, and to the financial
capabilities of receiving countries. Administration of military
grant and credit sales programs should remain with the Department
of Defense, supporting assistance, public safety programs and the
contingency fund should be administered by the Department of State.4
The President emphasized that it was essential to maintain an
adequate level of foreign assistance while a new program was being
formulated. This caution because Congress had substantially reduced
his request, which was already the lowest in history, in the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1969.
Another major Act was enacted on 22 October 1968 by Congress.
This was the Foreign Military Sales Act which consolidated and revised
into a single act legislation to authorize sales of defense articles
and services by the U.S. Government to friendly foreign countries
and international organizations. The act itself, and subsequent
instructions issued by the Secretary of Defense, includes clear and
precise instructions as to how this activity will be conducted. It
prohibits sales to countries where funds for development assistance
are directed to military expenditures, encourages unclassified defense
equipment sales by private industry whenever possible,provided the
arrangements are approved and consistent with the foreign policy
interest of the U.S., and through controls and reviews attempt to
control the impact of these sales on social and economic development
and on arms races.5
The Ship Loan Legislation enacted on 10 March 1951 provides
Congress with another control device. This act provides that no
transfer of major combatant naval vessel, i.e., battleships, carriers,
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, can be made without the specific
approval of Congress. In effect this provides a dual check in that
equipment of this type authorized under the Military Assistance Program
(MAP) cannot be transferred until it is also authorized under the
Ship Loan Act. 6
Aside from the legislation detailed above there are other forms
of guidance directly bearing on Military Assistance. These are prim-
arily in the form of international agreements and necessarily cover
a broad range of subjects, and vary from country to country. One
such class of agreements of particular interest because it is the
form which operates between the U.S. and South Korea is the type known
as Grant Aid Bilateral Agreements. These agreements are the vehicle
which provides the U.S. with the assurances which we feel protect
our interest. For instance, these agreements usually contain clauses
which obligate the recipient countries to obtain the consent of the
President of the United States before they: (1) permit any use of
MAP equipment by anyone other than an officer, employee, or agent
of that country; (2) transfer such articles by gift, sale, or other-
wise; (3) use such equipment for purposes other than those for which
furnished.
The agreements also demand that the recipient countries provide
security for the equipment, permit inspection of the equipment by
agents of the U.S., and return the equipment to the U.S. for disposition
unless a waiver is considered in the best interest of the United
States.7
Other forms of agreements which usually cover special cases are:
Special Grant Aid Agreements, when it is felt that aid is in the best
interest of the U.S., but the recipient does not wish to enter into
a bilateral agreement with the U.S.; Mutual Security Agreements;
Foreign Military Sales Bilateral Agreements; Cost-Sharing Agreements,
pertaining to those cases where material could be procured either
indigenously or in the U.S., with cost involved being charged by pre-
arranged formula to MAP funds and to the country in question such as
the case of shipbuilding in Norway and aircraft production in Japan;
Facilities Assistance Agreements, covering the situation where
facilities were provided at MAP expense, but the recipient agreed to
furnish the product, usually propellants and explosives, upon request
to other NATO members and other free world nations at a fair and
reasonable prices and not to discriminate in terms of price and quality,
time of delivery or performance; Mutual Defense Treaties; Atomic
Energy Treaties; Patent Agreements; and Tax Relief Agreements. 8
PLANNING AND PROGPM IING.
Within the legislative constraints outlined above, the planning
of the military assistance program is based on comprehensive guidance
from the Department of Defense, the Department of State and AID - the
administrator of AID is responsible for coordinating MAP with economic
aid; and DOD provides guidance setting forth U.S. policy objectives
and dollar guidelines for future planning for each country, as well
as specifying the military tasks which require emphasis in AID
programming. Within this framework, the planning of five year military
assistance programs on a regional and country-by-country basis also
depends on military requirements planning as visualized by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 9
On the basis of the JCS force goals and base requirements, and the
country dollar guidelines, the in-country Military Assistance and
Advisory Groups (MAAG) prepare and submit their proposed five year
equipment and training plan for the forces of recipient countries.
These plans are first submitted to the Unified Commander and include
both the dollar costs of equipment programmed under MAP, and the total
estimated local defense budget cost with which the dollar programs
are associated. Todal defense costs are subdivided into those to be
financed by the country itself, and those for which foreign assistance
is required. 1 0
The MAAG submission also includes a notation concerning expected
short falls between the JCS goals and the programmed funds, if any,
and an evaluation of the effect of these shortfalls to U.S. objectives
and the anticipated threat. The MAAG proposal is reviewed or modified
by the Unified Commander and submitted to the Department of Defense.
The DOD review procedure includes a variety of steps designed to
accomodate the MAAG submission to the various executive, legislative,
and political guidelines available. Following this review the programs
are submitted to the administrator of AID in his role as foreign aid
coordinator, and then to the Bureau of the Budget who in turn request
an allotment to implement the operating program for the current fiscal
year, and approves the basic estimates of the full term five year plan.12
After action by the Budget Bureau and further DOD coordination with
the Unified Commander and the local MAAGs, any necessary program
revisions are made so that the current program can be implemented.
Table I shows a schematic representation of this protess.
TABLE I
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-====Ie Secretary of Defense operates with the foreign and fiscal
policy guidelines laid down by the Secretaries of State and
Treasury, respectively
U.S. FOREIGN AID FOR 1OREA
Having reviewed the legislative and procedural facets of foreign
aid it is now possible to examine the details of how this program has
been applied in the case of South Korea.
Following the Japanese surrender offer of August 10, 1945, prompt
arrangements were necessary for the surrender of Japanese forces in
the Pacific and Asiatic theaters, including Korea. The decisions were
incorporated in General Order No.1, which defined areas of responsibility
for accepting surrender of all Japanese military forces. As regards
Korea, the order provided that Japanese forces north of the 38th
parallel were to surrender to the Soviet commanders, while those south
of that line surrender to the United States commanders. This was culmi.-
nated September 9, 1945.13
The main objective of the United States was to help make Korea a
free and independent nation. As commissioned by the United Nations,
the United States first facilitated the surrender of the Japanese
forces, then attempted to "reestablish Korea as an independent state'
through the Moscow Agreement of 1945. This agreement called for a
joint Soviet-U.S. Commission which was to assist in forming a provisional
Korean democratic government, but, after two meetings, failed to agree
on any major issues. On September 17, 1947, the United States submitted
the Korean problem to the United Nations .14
From the beginning of the occupation through 1948 the United States
Government spent $300 million for relief and rehabilitation of South
Korea. Only about 10 percent of this amount was used for development
)rojects while the rest was used for supplies needed for relief.
On December 10, 1948 an economic aid agreement between the
Republic of Korea and the United States was signed with the administrat-
ion of American foreign aid entrusted to the Economic Cooperation
Administration (ECA). The terms of this agreement were designed to
enable the ECA to see that the aid given was being used to the best
advantage of the Korean Government for economic development. The
emphasis of American aid was thereby shifted from that of relief to
economic development in South Korea. Furthermore, the United States,
under the Initial Financial and Property Settlement Agreement of
September 11, 1948, gave as a gift to the Republic miscellaneous
assets, including 101 locomotives valued at $7.07 million, various
capital improvements valued at over $32 million and various surplus
military supplies. Twenty-four million dollars was also credited to
the Korean Government in payment for debts incurred by the United States
forces during the three years of occupation, and all foreign exchange
created during the occupation was turned over to the Republic of Korea
by the United States. Also under the agreement was the settlement of
the $25 million Foreign Liquidation Commission Loan made by the United
States to Korea; the terms provided, inter alia, for the creation of
an education fund to be administered jointly by Korean and American
governments .15
With the foundation being laid for economic stabilization, one
could have looked forward to vast economic reconstruction, but the
Korean War started forcing these aims to the future.
Since 1945 assistance from the United States has been of two types-
economic aid and military aid. The greater portion of U.S. economic
aid has consisted of grant-type aid and deliveries of surplus
agricultural commodities under Title I of Plan 480.16 During the
period 1946 to 1967 the United States assistance to the Republic of
Korea totalled $6,070 million, of which $4,020 million was economic
aid and $2,050 million military aid. Since 1958 the United States
has placed increasing emphasis on AID loans while the amount of grants
has been decreased. Table II is a sunmary of American economic aid
received by South Korea from 1953 to 1967.
TABLE II
SU14ARY OF U.S. ECONOMIC AID RECEIVED
(in $1,000)
Calendar Under Under 'OTAL
Year AID Title I
Pl. 480
1953 5,571 5,571
1954 82,437 82,437
1955 205,815 - 205,815
1956 271,049 32,955 304,004
1957 323,268 45,522 368,790
1958 265,629 47,896 313,525
1959 208,297 11,436 219,733
1960 225,237 19,913 245,150
1961 154,319 44,926 199,245
1962 165,001 67,308 232,309
1963 119,659 96,824 216,483
1964 88,346 60,985 149,331
1965 71,904 59,537 131,441 a
1966 65,310 37,951 103,261
1967 52,640 44,293 96,933 b
Source: (a) Korea, Korea Annual, 96 (Seoul, Korea: Hapdong News
Agency, 1967), p. 164
(b) Korea, Major Economic Indicator 1957-58, Republic of
Korea, 1968), p. 80
TABLE III is a sununary of the Military Assistance to South Korea
from 1950 to 1969. It includes the dollar value of all deliveries and
expenditures for this period and in addition includes a detail of the
value of deliveries of excess defense articles delivered to Korea.
Defense stocks in long supply and excess are sometimes used to meet
valid MAP requirements without reimbursement. While they are put to
good use, they cannot be depended upon to meet specific needs that
must be filled on a real time basis, because in most cases this excess
supply will not be predictable, or in sufficient quantity or type to
justify routine or programed supply action. Nor can they be expected
to supply newer types of equipment to service the old equipment often
in use in foreign countries. Mkch of the equipment supplied requires
major repair efforts before it can be used and in many cases is useable
only as a source of spare parts. Although this category has only a
marginal utility value, its issue falls within the purview of the same
criteria and legislative restrictions which cover all MAP grant aid.
KOREAN M
MAP deliveries
Excess Articles
TABLE III
AP AND EXCESS DEFENSE ARTICLES BY FISCAL YEARS
(In Missions)
FY 1950-64 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 50
1,030.6 173.1 153.1 149.8 197.4 210.0 2,7
(a) 150.7 23.6 8.0 1.8 3.4 27.7 2
(a) Value is UTILITY VALUE computed to be 30% or rea
value
Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts
March, 1970 pp. 12-14
46
-69
14.0
15.2
1
It was recently announced that as of 1 April 1971 the functions
of the Army, Navy and Air Force Advisory Groups will be consolidated
under a single headquarters to be called the Joint United States Military
Assistance Group, Korea (JUSAG-K). The Commander of the JUSMAG-K
will report directly to the commander of U.S. Forces Korea.17
At the service level each MAAG is divided into two major divisions -
the programming, charged with providing the input described in detail
above, and the advisory staff charged with a variety of duties and
dealing directly with their counterparts in the ROK forces.
All services have training programs for each group in either formal
schools such as the Army Advisory Institute at Fort Bragg, N.C. and
the Air Force Advisory courses at the Special Air Warfare School,
Hurlbert Field, Fla., or through training manuals detailing the various
job requirements and techniques which are made available to those not
able to attend the formal schools. 18
During the past several years the total number of advisors assigned
to South Korea has stabilized at about 1200.19 The number of advisors
is sensitive to the MAP appropriations and also fluctuates as special
programs develop.
In addition to the programming and advisory activities another of
the major functions of the MAAG is to manage the implementation of the
MAP training program. This program has proved to be one of the most
effective facets of Korean Military Assistance. Besides the obvious
technical value of the training given to selected personnel, the
orientation visits to the United States help create strong bonds of
friendship and understanding.
Between fiscal year 1950 to 1969 a total of 29,808 Korean nationals
have received MAP funded training. Of these 20,688 have received their
training at military and civilian training centers in the U.S. while
9,120 participated in training programs conducted at other overseas
locations. 20 The basic criteria for selection for one of the training
programs is that the selectee should be eligible and qualified for
instructor duty, have at least two times the length of the course of
retainability in the military - some special courses require up to
five years of retainability, and have some English language training.
The final selection is made by the Chief of MAAG. Another varient of
the M4AP training program consists of orientation tours for selected
key senior military personnel. These tours consist of visits to U.S.
military centers and demonstrations of various types of equipment and
tactics.
While the majority of U.S. assistance for Korea is in the form of
Military Assistance Grant Aid, two other aid forms previously mentioned
operate in Korea and should be mentioned. P1 480 Title I surplus
agricultural produce are provided to the government and sold in the local
economy. Funds realized, called the WON Budget, are used to procure
equipment, material, facilities and services for defense, TWenty per-
cent of the funds are reserved for U.S. use, i.e., embassy operating
expenses and USIA operations. Korea uses mostly wheat and cotton. In
1966 the total of PL. 480 funds was 104.1 million.21
The other source of income is called Supporting Assistance or Counter-
part Funds, about 50 million a year was made available to finance the
purchase of raw materials and other essential imports through routine
comerical channels. The exporter is paid in dollars and the local
importer pays the government in local currency. These funds are then
used to finance defense or other programs.22
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QI2APTER IV
ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTI KOREAN 'IAAG EFFORT
To attempt an analysis of such a program it is imperative to
first define as accurately as possible exactly what military
assistance is.
The specific objectives of any Military Assistance Program are
threefold: political, economic, and military.
In the political area the program is intended not to win friends
or generate gratitude on the part of our allies - but, first and fore-
most, to serve our own national self-interest. The aim is to encourage
a commitment to collective security among recipient countries which
parallel our view concerning existing threats. This, in order to
create political conditions where free world peoples may be in a
position to resist encroachments on their freedoms, particularly in
those areas which lack the means to carry the burden of this security
without assistance.
The Military Assistance Program promotes this country's economic
interest in several ways. Indigenous forces are encouraged to share
their resources and skills, provided and developed in many cases by
the MAP, with the local population. This infusion of skill and material
in underdeveloped areas raises the overall economic condition of the
area and helps to bring about self-sufficiency more quickly. There
are many examples of this in Korea where equipment and manpower are
active in a number of "civic action" programs.
As the MAP matures and the recipient countries become more self-
sufficient, they are encouraged to contribute a larger share of their
resources to supporting the security establishment, and ultimately
this cost sharing is extended to their less developed neighbors 'so
that the responsibility for providing for the secure environment
necessary for continued prosperity becomes less of a burden on anyone
member. This evolution is the basis of the Nixon Doctrine, and can
be witnessed in operation in Korea today.
Foreign Military Sales, another facet of Military Assistance,
is also economically beneficial to the U.S. By encouraging the purchase
of military equipment by free world nations who can afford them, we
are able to ease the problems of balance of payments and the gold flow.
The military objectives of the assistance program are perhaps
easier to define. Clearly contributions which support an indigenous
military capability which will deter overt aggression, or failing
that, will provide a buffer necessary to implement our own contingency
plans; or operate to contain insurgency and other covert threats to
internal security, thus minimizing the need for direct military support
by us or other free world nations - a formula which has become in-
creasingly unpopular and expensive - cannot be achieved more reliably
and at less expense and risk through any means other than the Military
Assistance Program. 1
The Korean case follows the above definition quite closely and
while it is difficult to evaluate the program without access to
classified material, it is possible to draw conclusions about its
overall effectiveness by analysing the performance of the Korean
forces in the two areas where they have been tested - against the
threat from North Korea and as active participants in the Vietnam
war.
The threat from North Korea pre-dates the Korean War. In fact,
it was the liquidation of a North Korean insurgency plot designed
to overthrow the Syngman Rhee regime which is said to have lead to
the conventional attack across the 38th Parallel in June 1950.2
Following the war in the mid 1950's another campaign of psychological
warfare accompanied by the despatch of agents into the South was
launched by Kim II Sung. This campaign was punctuated by a
"confederation plan" for unity in the year following Syngman Rhee's
overthrow in April 1960 and the military takeover in Seoul in May,
1961.3
All through the early 1960's there were a series of proposals
for Korean unification emanating from Pyongyang. A confederation
of the North and South has been proposed, as well as cultural and
economic exchanges, arms curtailment agreements, resumption of postal
services, and free elections (i.e. unsupervised). 4 The essence of
the North Korean view is that unification has to come about through
Korean-to-Korean talks, that the U.N. must have no part in the uni-
fication, that U.S. troops must first withdraw from South Korea; but
if all the above cannot be accomplished at once, North Korea would
promote various interchange between the north and south and in the
meantime, North Korea will furnish aid to the South. 5
To all of these conditions the ROK has said no. Therefore, in
the view of the north the rejection of these proposals for unifi-
dation has meant that, "broad sections of the South Korean people
are now waging vigorously the anti-U.S. national salvation struggle."6
The increased militancy of North Korea, from which we can draw
conclusions about the effectiveness of the South Korean military and
coincidentally the U.S. Military Assistance Program, can be traced
to a shift in policy announced by Kim Il Sung at the Party conferece
of Oct. 1966. During this speech Kim stated that the U.S. and its
South Korean puppets were preparing a new war against the north, and
explicitly called for an intensification of the struggle against the
South.7
In December of 1967 Premier Kim Il Sung again restated the policy
of North Korea when he addressed the Sunreme People's Assembly as
follows:
The entire people in the northern half of the
Republic bear the heavy responsibility for carrying
the South Korean revolution to completion.
The accomplishment of the great cause of the
liberation of South Korea and the unification
of the fatherland at the earliest possible
date, depends not only on the revolutionary
organizations and revolutionaries in South
Korea to expand and strengthen the revolutionary
forces and how they fight the enemy, but, in a
large measure, on how the people in the northern
half of the Republic prepare themselves to greet
the great revolutionary event.
The people in the northern half of the Republic
should always remember the brothers in the south
and have a revolutionary determination to liberate
them at all cost; they should be firmly prepared
ideologically so that they may be mobilized to a
decisive struggle to accomplish the cause of
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unification of the fatherland by joining hands
with the South Korean people whenever called
upon to come to their aid as the struggle of
the people surges forward, and the revolutionary
situation opens in South Korea.
The escalation of activities has been most intense in the increase
of INZ incidents. Table (III-A) shows the scope of these activities
during the period prior to the policy shift and the dramatic change
immediately following. The United Nations Command reported a total
of 445 serious incidents in the IMZ for 1967 and a total of 543 for
1968.9 Concerning infiltrations, both by land through the INIZ and
those by sea, it was reported that from Aug. 1, 1967 to Aug. 21, 1968
there were 154 North Koreans killed, 19 wounded and 15 captured
while attempting to infiltrate through the IZ. Between Oct. 30, 1968
and Nov. 2, 1968 110 North Koreans were killed and 7 captured while
infiltrating by sea.10 Prisoner interrogation revealed that North
Korea was training 8,000 commandos in special camps, with units
assigned to each ROK province. North Korean activity reached a
peak during 1968 beginning on January 2nd when a 31 man assassination
commando of the North Korean 124th Army Unit got within 500 yards of
the presidential palace.
On January 26 1968 the USS Pueblo, along with her crew, was seized
while on an intelligence mission off the coast of North Korea.12
During this same year the armed forces and police intercepted a number
of armed agents as well as previously planted cells. The following
is a resume of the major incidents of 1968 which dramatize the nature,
scope and methods typical of the threat situation against which South
Korea must defend itself.
TABLE III-A
INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES CAUSED BY NORTI KOREAN
INFILTRATION
'I October 18, 1965 1966 1967
Significant Incidents, IJZ Area 42 37 423
Significant Incidents, interior of ROK 17 13 120
Exchanges of Fire, IMZ 23 19 117
Exchanges of Fire, interior of ROK 6 11 95
Casualties, N.K. killed in ROK 4 43 224
Casualties, N.K. captured in ROK 51 19 50
UNC, Killed ROK 21 35 122
JNC Wounded ROK 6 29 279
ROK Nat.Police and other Civ.Killed 19 4 22
ROK Nat.Police and other Civ.Wounded 13 5 53
Source: Korea Annual 1968, Hapdong News Agency
COAfANDO RAID ON SEOUL. A 31 man North Korean armed comando
infiltrated deep into the northern suburbs of Seoul on Jan. 21.
RADIO AGENTS. The CIA announced on Feb. 1 that it rounded up a
32 man North Korean espionage ring which had been operating in Seoul
Taegu and Pusan for more than two years.
The spy ring collected military secrets of Korea and the United
States. Information on South Korean political and economic situations
was released via a clandestine radio link with North Korea. They also
organized an underground Comunist Party cell.
PLANTED AGENTS. The Seoul Police cracked down on a Comunist espionage
ring on March 25.
AIED AGENTS. Four North Korean comunist agents landed on March 26
in Kunja. Spotted by fisherman and reported.
FAMILY AGENTS. The National Police broke up a six member family spy ring
on April 20 in Seoul.
IMJA ISLAND AGENTS. The CIA rounded up 27 communist agents July 20
who had been operating in Seoul and other areas under the direction of
a Red underground post located in Imj-do.
HOSA ISLAND AGENTS. Joint military and police force shot and killed
two armed agents in a mountain near Mokpo on July 29.
CCM4ANDO AGENTS. A combined counter - espionage task force smashed
a 14 man North Korean commando team in a pre-dawn fight on Aug. 21 on
the southern shore of Cheju-do.
U.R.P. AGEN'S. The CIA crushed a 158 member North Korean espionage
ring, named the Unification Revolutionary Party which attempted to
instigate civil insurgency and topple the government.
ULCIIN - SAMCIIOK ARMED AGENTS. About 30 communist armed agents landed
at Ulchin on Nov. 5.
Prompted by this stepped up activity the ROK government took many
unprecedented actions in order to tighten security. Counter espionage
activity was re-organized under a unified military police command,
all possible infiltrations routes were blocked and patrols of sea
approaches were increased, and the rewards for information leading
to the arrest of suspected North Korean agents was raised from 200,000
won to-up to 1 million won.13
The North Koreans are also active on the propaganda front and
via the "South Korean Liberation Radio" which broadcasts from North
Korea and using other conventional propaganda media, South Korean
military personnel are encouraged to defect. The defectors are promised
a variety of incentives including general amnesty, special commendations,
equal rank and jobs in the North Korean military, education opportu-
nities and financial rewards. Table (IV) indicates typical rewards
offered to defectors who turn over items of equipment. These rewards
are broadcast over radio and public address announcements directed
to troops on patrol duty on the IZ. 14
TABLE IV
INDUCEENTS OFFERED SOUTII KOREAN DEFECrORS.
1. Battleship (big and small ship) 200,000 to 5,000,000 won
(Note 1 1 North Korean Won = 40 f)
2. Jet Aircraft 30,000 to 500,000 won
3. Guided Missile 30,000 to 100,000 won
4. Propeller Aircraft 5,000 to 30,000 won
5. Tank 5,000 to 10,000 won
6. Cannons 400 to 2,000 won
7. Heavy Machine guns 900 to 1,000 won
8. Light Machine guns 350 to 500 won
9. M-14 Rifles 500 won
10. Short Machine gun 200 to 250 won
11. Infantryman's rifle 50 to 300 won
12. Pistol 200 won
13. Radio 400 to 800 won (8 to 16 months sAlary of worker)
Source, notes on North Korea, U. S. Dept. of Army, Headquarters
17th Psychological Ops. Group APO S.F. 96248 15 July 1966.
Considering the above mentioned incidents as well as numerous
similar provocations repeated on an almost daily basis two points
are clear. First, the security of South Korea is threatened by an
enemy which has both the means and the will to sustain the threat;
and second, the responsibility of countering the threat requires
constant effort on the part of each branch of the South Korean
military. Their performance can be interpreted as a measure of how
well they have assimilated the equipment and training provided by
the Military Assistance Program, because one of the major goals of
the program is to interpret the threat and provide the proper mix
of hardware and training required for an effective counter.
Therefore, considering the threat and the counter measures, the
following factors are germann: The morale of the ROK military is
very high, and although North Korean infiltrators have managed to
cross the INZ on several occasions they are almost always caught
within a matter of days. Since 1968 INZ security has been increased
with the introduction of sophisticated electronic and infrared
devices and although the attempted IMZ penetrations remain high,
the nuinber succeeding has been reduced. The North Korean counter
to improved IZ security has been an increase in sea infiltration
attempts. Here again the threat has been met by improved tactics,
coordination, and equipment for air and naval forces. The announced
U.S. withdrawal from the '18 mile sector of the IMZ and their re-
placement by ROK troops indicates a level of confidence in the
ability of the ROK military to fill the -gap in that a large comple-
ment of U.1S. forces will remain in rear areas, somewhat dependent
on protection and warning provided by the ROK army.
The dynamic expansion of the South Korean economy is also a
viable indicator of the security provided by the military. During
the 1960's the economy advanced at an average rate of 10-11% per year.
Bank of Korea figures indicate that for 1968 the growth rate was over
13%, based on the 1965 constant, thus allowing for inflation. The
ROK gross national product in 1967 was $4.6 billion, and South Korean
exports totalled $455 million in 1968, compared with $33 million in
1960, and the figure reached a billion dollars in 1970.15
During 1968 more than 50 large factories began operation producing
automobiles, fertilizer, cement, petro-chemicals and electronic compo-
n tn - 1 6
On February 13, 1971 Deputy Premier Kim Hak-Yul announced the
nation's third 5 year economic plan calling for an average annual
growth rate of 8.6% from 1972 to 1976.
The goals of the new plan include a 25% annual rise in comodity
exports to $3.5 billion in 1976 and increase of GNP to $13.3 billion.17
Another economic indicator supporting the high level of confidence
in the ability of the military to provide security is the large amount
of foreign investment Attracted to South Korea. Japan, West Gjermany,
Britain and U.S. investors are quite active in Korea and the trend
is increasing. For instance the Greyhound Bus company recently announced
an arrangement with a Korean transportation company to utili ze excess
U.S. equipment and take advantage of the rapidly expanding highway
systems. 1 8
Another demonstration of the high confidence in internal security
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is indicated by the renewed political activity in South Korea.
Since the military coup d'etat on May 16, 1961 the country has been
directed by President Park Chung Iee, the original leader of the
coup, and the electoral process has been limited to a more or less
one party system. However, more conventional political activity has
returned and the campaigning attendant to the general elections
scheduled this year is replete with those activities generally associat-
ed with free democratic elections.
THE VIET NAM TEST
The second area which offers a realistic test situation against
which the Korean military, and vicariously the Korean MA.P, can be
evaluated is the Korean involvement in Vietnam.
Recently Lt. Gen. Si Ho Lee, the Korean commander in Vietnam,
announced that a total of 230,000 Korean servicemen had served in
Vietnam. le further observed that: "The reservoir of combat -
experienced troops represents a significant power superiority over
the North Koreans who have not had combat experience since July
1953. 19' The deployment of Korean units began in 1964 - the first
time Korean units had been dispatched overseas and consisted of a
field surgery and a group of tackwondo (a Korean form of self-defense)
instructors. They were soon joined in Feb. 1965 by a 2,000 man non-
combat unit called the "Dove" units. This group included engineers
and security forces and their mission was to participate in rehabili-
tation and "civic action" type projects. Then, in Oct. 1965, upon
official request from the South Vietnamese government, a divisional
strength group of Korean combat troops was added to the Vietnam force.
At the time South Korean officials comented that the action was in
part to repay the "moral debts" to the United States and the rest
of the free world owed since the Korean War. This contingent conssted
of the "Fierce Tiger Unit" composed of two regiments from the Army
Capital Division and the Second Marine Brigade called the "Blue Dragon
Unit." In Aug. 1966 the authorized strength of the South Korean forces
in Vietnam was raised to 47,872 men with the addition of the "White
Horse" division. The total authorized strength total has remained
constant up to the present time.20
The practical combat experience referred to by General Lee has
been quite extensive and impressive. During the three year period
from Sept. 1965 to Oct. 1968 the ROK combat forces are credited with
19,175 enemy killed, 3,551 enemy captured, and 7,993 individual weapons,
687 group weapons, 788,796 rounds of ammunition, 14,551 grenades,
147 communications sets, and 43,226 enemy documents captured.
Table (V) is a breakdown of South Korean combat activity by major
units. It also includes the number of engagements in which the
statistics were compiled which gives some indication of the type of
experience Vietnam is for the Korean forces.
TABLE V
RESULTS OF BATTLES IN VIETNAM
Enemy Killed
Enemy Captured
Surrendered
Weapons Cap. (ind)
Weapons Cap. (group)
No.of engagements
Total
20,780
3,765
2,062
8,663
771
2,334
Tiger
10,097
2,875
959
4,155
387
1,353
W. Horse
5,263
555
612
2,504
249
681
Dragons
5,303
306
478
1,956
122
377
Other
117
29
13
48
13
24
Source - Korea Annual 1969
The Civic Action and pacification activity has also been extensive.
A total of 108 bridges, 125 schoolrooms, 328 kilometers of roads,
1,134 houses and 58 pagodas and churches were built for the local
Vietnamese population. 21
As of February 1970 the cumulative South Korean casualties in
Vietnam were 3,094 killed, 6,057 wounded and four missing in action.22
Although South Korean troops are serving in Vietnam at the invi-
tation of the government, the entire cost is being subsidized by the
United States and is not charged against the Military Assistance Program
of Korea. The U.S. has expended $927.5 million to support the Korean
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force for the period 1965-1970. This includes $130.2 million "over-
seas allowance" and $10.2 million death and disability compensations
according to testimony by State and Defense Department officials before
a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee hearing on the U.S. security
agreement with South Korea. 23
Besides combat experience the Vietnam experience has also profited
South Korea in that most of the support for these troops is furnished
by contractors in South Korea. For instance uniforms are produced in
South Korea and paid for by the U.S. The same is true for most of
the estimated $5,000 annual support cost for each South Korean
soldier in Vietnam. 2 4
The combat experience is the main issue however, and both the
statistics cited in Table V and the fact that comments concerning
the performance of South Korean forces have generally been quite favor-
able, are indicators of the efficiency of the MAP furnished training
which has been instrumental in allowing these forces to integrate so
well in the combined theater type operations in Vietnam.
It should also be noted that while in Vietnam the ROK forces
participate in operations, both joint and local, under control of
a centralized command, and utilize the most advanced forms of close
air and other types of combat support. Upon return to Korea, these
veterans form the nucleous of the ROK home defense forces and are able
to upgrade their training programs and exerciaes from first hand
experience.
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CHAPTER V
All military personnel who are selected to become advisors or
programers in the Military Assistance Program are told that the ulti-
mate success is to have worked themselves out of a job. By interpol-
ation then, the MAP itself should be finite and at some point in time
simply cease to be required.
In the Korean case it has been shown that when measured against
actual combat criteria South Korean military forces have been quite
effective. They are able to utilize modern equipment and tactics
which have neutralized specific threats. However, before accepting
the performance of the South Korean military forces in the INAZ and
Vietman examples as conclusive indicators of their overall capabil-
ities, and from this conclude that the MAP has completed its task,
these examples should be examined in an expanded perspective.
All modern military forces depend heavily on a large support base.
Furthemore, the combat effectiveness of the force is directly pro-
portional to the efficiency of the support mechanism.
The INZ and Vietnam examples, although both are reliable indicat-
or of combat effectiveness, do not completely test the entire spectrun
of military requirements, and if taken at face value can disguise
some serious problem areas concerning both the South Korean military
and the U.S. M.A.P.
All of the incidents along the I4Z, and the counter insurgency
operations in South Korea have been relatively small and of short
duration. They have been conducted in an environment most favorable
to the government forces. The operations are conducted in familiar
terrain with extremely good intelligence available. The forces have
access to both electronic and air reconnaissance, and whenever oper-
ations extend away from the immediate area of the TIZ, they enjoy the
full cooperation of the local population.
Since the operations are limited in scope, they have the advan-
tage of being able to bring all available resources to bear on the
situation. Small scale activity also impose no unusual strain on
logistics, maintenance, and supply support so that problems which
might exist in these critical areas do not develop or compromise the
mission.
In Vietnam, operations are on a much larger scale and are con-
ducted over extended periods. But here again, because of the agree-
ments under which these forces were committed, the United States
supplies or funds all material, ammunitions, rations, and even the pay
and allowances of the troops. The United States also furnishes
combat assistance by providing close air support, reconnaissance, and
off shore naval fire support for Korean operations, but it should be
noted that the MAP has concentrated on equipping and training the
ROK military as a defensive force only. This is clearly evident in
the type of equipment which has been provided in the past, and it is
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only recently, as a part of the compromise agreements for the with-
drawing of American forces from South Korea, that some exceptions
have been made.
It is, in fact, in this critical area of support that serious
questions exist about the ROK military forces, and where the effect-
iveness of the MAP can be challenged. The following discussion should
also indicate that there exist, and will continue to exist for quite
some time, a need for military assistance.
The area of primary concern, and what is probably the weakest
link in the South Korean security chain is that which can be broadly
included under the heading of material which, in the military context,
includes supply, maintenance and logistics activities. The problems
are not new, in a report on Military Assistance prepaired by a staff
of the Committee on Foreign Affairs who visited Korea in 1960,
material was the only area which received unfavorable comments. The
criticisms of the staff survey team in 1960 could easily apply today
except that in todays environment and dealing with far more complex
1
equipment, the effects are far greater.
As the South Korean military establishment has grown and adjusted
to the demands generated by the dynamic nature of the North Korean
threat, the priorities for the limited resources have not favored
the material area. Real, and sometimes imagined, requirements for
new equipment have often been satisfied at the expense of resources
which should have been used to develop material support. But.rather,
new equipment enters the inventory and the already critically over-
loaded material systems is required to meet additional demands.
Besides the process described above, another practice exists in
South Korea which compounds the problem and by nature is diametrically
opposed to the basic intent of the MAP. This develops whenever some
dramatic event, such as the Pueblo incident, focuses attention on the
lack of certain types of armaments thereby causing large amounts of
money to be made available. In this case $100 million of special
military assistance was immediately approved for the purchase of equip-
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ment,2 and again, more recently, as part of a compromise plan concern-
ing the withdrawal of U.S. troops, $150 million of modernization funds
as well as $100 million of surplus equipment is to be released to the ROK.3
This massive and unprogrammed infusion of funds and new equipment
is totally outside of the normal 5 year MAP programming cycle. Because
of this, the support base is not developed, maintenance personnel are
not trained, stock list and supplies are not available in the depot,
nor is the pipeline to U.S. supply sources established.
The cause and effect relationship of material problems can best
be demonstrated within the context of a hypothetical example.
As part of the total Air Defense environment, South Korea maintains
a network of Aircraft Control and Warning radar sites. These sites
are remote and access is at best difficult, and at times impossible,
except by helicopter. During periods of bad flying weather, common
in the winter, the sites are inaccessible. The sites are equipped
with very modern and sophisticated radar and communication equipment,
and each site is theoretically capable of all levels of maintenance
up to depot level overhaul. All such installations have some hi-
value items which are critical to the operation of the site such as
radar magnetrons and power generators. Because these sites provide
strategic coverage, and because the facilities are used for both South
Korean and U.S. areal maneuvers, it is essential that the outage times
be kept to a minimun. It is when there is a failure of one of the high
value critical items that the inherent weaknesses of the material
systems are exposed.
First, one discovers that the quality of maintenance personnel
is questionable. Because of limited funds, training programs are in-
adequate and airmen are sent to the field with little, if any, actual
equipment experience. Their lack of training, and the high priority
of the service, force supervisory personnel to be reluctant to allow
them on-the-job experience opportunities. At best they are allowed
to look over someone's -houlder while work is being done. The super-
visors on the other hand, well trained and competent because of MAP
furnished stateside training and long experience with the equipment,
dislike the remoteness and hardships of the radar sites and work
diligently to obtain assignements to more comfortable installation.
Failing this, many leave the service for one of the many tempting job
opportunities available in the expanding economy.
When the fault is eventually diagnosed, the problem enters the
supply phase. The failed component is requested from the on-site
supply facility, but at most operating locations, because adequate
stock levels represent a huge investment, one finds that the spare
parts inventories have been allowed to deplete, and high value items
with long replacement lead time are not ordered.
It is now necessary to refer the problem to the depot where
supplies have been concentrated and the mechanism for obtaining parts
from the source has been centralized.
Assuming the best case, the part will be available, but in order
to effect the repair, either the part or the faulty sub-system must
enter the logistic network. If truck transport is used, the cheapest
and most available, the component must be subjected to several hours
of some of the world's worst roads. In the case of high-value delicate
components they often arrive at their destination in unserviceable
condition. To avoid this, and because of pressure to return a system
to operation, helicopter transport is requested and the overall main-
tenance cost is driven still higher because of this special handling.
Assuming another case, often it is determined that failed compo-
nents cannot be repaired at the operating location. The most common
reason for this is that either qualified maintenance personnel, or
the test equipment essential for proper trouble shooting, but also
very expensive and generally suffers the same neglect as the prime
equipment, are simply often not available. The component itself must
then be transported to the depot for service. The depot, normally
intended to perform scheduled overhaul, must shift its emphasis from
normal work in order to do that which properly belongs at the
operating location.
As a final assumption, let the failed component belong to a class
other than the standard military type for which catalogues and stock-
list are available and identification and procurement are normal. In
South Korea it is a common practice to contract for MtAP furnished
systems. These systems are therefore made up of off-the-shelf
components which do not have military style stocklist and catalogues.
For instance, at the typical radar site mentioned above, the power
generators are commercial models and further, because the procurement
contracts were written at different times, they might not even be the
same series of a given type. For economy reasons, the modems (modulator-
demodulator) of the communication equipment were manufactured in Belgium.
The radar sets themselves are a type designed and manufactured for MAP
recipients only and are not part of the U.S. military inventory.
It is not necessary to detail the problems that this practice gene-
rates, however, anyone familiar with the problems of maintaining
a vintage foreign car will recognize obvious similarities.
Another major support area which has been mentioned previously,
but primarily in a quantitative rather than qualitative sense, is
training. There exist much documentation and discussion about this
area, however, the bulk of the commentary is primarily concerned
with the total number of students trained, the various types of train-
ing programs available, the retention rate of graduates, stateside
vs. in country quotas, and other similar issues.
In a series of hearings before the Subcommittee on National
Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives, on the subject of Military
Assistance Training, several expert witnesses generally agreed that
the training programs, both technical and professional, were of high
quality and were well managed. They further agreed that the direct
and the spin-off benefits of MAP sponsored training justified the cost
of the program. 4
In South Korea it has been pointed out that over the years a large
training establishment has been developed, and that at the present time
the majority of military training is done in country. Those ROK
personnel which are sent to U.S. schools are required to become
instructors so as to fully exploit and justify the cost of their train-
ing.
But in the in country technical training program the same con-
straints operate as were described in the material area, and even
assuming the very best quality and exceptionally motivated instructors,
these constraints seriously limit the effectiveness of the program.
Students simply do not get practical experience. Technicians are sent
into the field without ever having touched the equipment they are
supposed to maintain. The entire experience consists of lectures
and perhaps the opportunity to observe an instructor while he mani-
pulates test equipment and makes adjustments. Because many of the
systems in use are procured from commercial sources, training mockups
are not available, maintenance manuals are either not available or
not translated, and the special test equipment required for these
systems is in such limited supply that none can be spared for the
training center.
To the casual observer the South Korean training apparatus would
appear as a strong, self-sustaining foundation which will fill the
current and future needs of the military. But since the quality of
the lower ranking trainees is questionable for the reasons suggested,
much depends on the regular input of U.S. trained instructors and
supervisors. As the incentives to leave the service, i.e. competition
from the rapidly expanding economy, job dissatisfaction, low pay, etc.,
increase and erodes the available resources, one is faced with two
alternatives: sustain or increase MAP training programs, or re-evaluate
the priorities and attempt to reverse the current trends.
The role of the advisor is another subject which has received a
great deal of consideration, but again the main emphasis of most of
these investigations is concerned with the numbers of advisors and the
cost of the advisory mission. There is also valuable documentation
concerning the vital relationship of the advisor and his counterpart.
Problems such as language, disparity of rank, and short tours are
well documented. While these considerations are important and are
integral to the overall effectiveness of the MAP, there are other
issues, more subjective and not as easily quantified, which also
operate.
Military advisors for South Korea are selected because of their
technical expertise, demonstrated by their effectiveness in U.S.
military organizations. At present very few receive any special
preparation for their assignment such as what was offered by the
Military Assistance Institute before it was discontinued in 1969 for
economy reasons. Recently the U.S. Army and the Air Force have re-
established formal training programs, but these are very limited in
time and size so that relatively few advisors will benefit from 'the
experience.
Assuming that the new schools will be patterned after the Military
Advisory Institute model, one can expect that the student advisor
will be exposed to two major courses. One dealing with the admin-
istrative and programming details of the MAP, and the other featuring
specialized country study for the area to which he has been assigned.
Whatever the preparation of the advisor, when he arrives in South
Korea he is faced with the same problem which limit the Koreans them-
selves. His utility, therefore, is based, not primarily on his tech-
nical skill, but on his ability to adapt to a variety of demands which
for most advisors are totally new experiences for which he has had
no preparation. He generally finds that his counterparts have years
of experience in the assigned equipment, and have often received more
formal training than he has. Since most advisors are genuinely
conscientious and closely identify with the units to which they are
assigned, they apply themselves to solving or working around the
problems which do affect the organization. Often this results in
fixes which are contrary to the intent of the MAP, but justified in
terms of operational efficiency. The advisor becomes a go-between
for his Korean unit and U.S. forces who are concerned about service
which may not be up to U.S. standards. He must acquaint himself with
the details of those support areas which are at the root of the problem.
ie must develope those diplomatic skills necessary to persuade his
counterpart to bring pressure on support agencies, very difficult
because of the Korean reluctance to inconvenience a classmate or
friend. He must learn how and which operating practice to by-pass when
it becomes obvious that not to do so would compromise MAP goals.
The successful advisor has in fact developed a whole new expertise,
but because the learning process has been long and obtuse, he finds
himself rotated just as he reaches the peak of his productivity.
Because few individual serve more than one MAAG tour, the acquired
skill is lost and the whole process must be repeated with his re-
placement.
The above briefly describes irregularities in three important
components of the support area. Although the views expressed are
representative of the Commuications/Electronics area primarily based
on personal experience, they are consistent with all support areas.
Furthermore, the practice of generating funds for new capital invest-
ment by the methods described is not limited to the support areas.
Operational training exercises of all three services are conducted
under the same constraints.
While these practices result in inefficiencies and wasted effort
for both South Korean and U.S. personnel, they are manageable on a
day by day basis. It is when one considers the basic question of
South Korean self-sufficiency with less than the present level of U.S.
involvement that it becomes obvious that much additional study and
investigation is required to determine the future direction and
intensity of the MAP.
I
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS:
In the introduction to this paper I expressed concern that the
value of this investigation would be limited because of the constraint
of security classification, and limited time and research material.
These factors have in fact been limiting, however, I feel I have
included sufficient documentation to support some observations which
may not be conclusive in themselves, but do serve to highlight some
of the problems and some of the successful features of the South
Korean M.A.P.
I feel that the turmoil following the announcement of the Nixon
Doctrine described at length in Chapter I is significant in that it
is an indicator of the degree of self-confidence the South Koreans
have in their Military establishment. The extreme language in which
South Korean officials dramatized their concern over implied with-
drawal of U.S. forces is surely not consistent with the demonstrated
capabilities of the ROK forces in Vietnam and along the IM4Z. There
is, of course, the possibility that this concern was merely an effort
to continue the status quo for reasons other than defense, but this
hypothesis is beyond the scope of this exercise.
One of the reasons for selecting South Korea as my model was that
there exists an actual threat to the security of the country. I feel
this is important because an analysis of the threat, its viability And
the effectiveness of the response, will provide a perspective for
evaluating the military establishment. That North Korea provides a
real threat is clear, even though the threat has been primarily
exercised through low level EIZ actions and agent infiltration,
there does exist the potential for escalating this level of
activity into more convential and sustained military action. The
documentation reveals that against the present type of North
Korean activity, the South has been very successful in applying proper
and effective counters. Further analysis of the threat aspect
reveals specific areas which require emphasis in current and future
MAAG planning. For instance, the North Koreans have a decided
advantage in air power; demonstrated by their quantitative and,
excepting South Korea's F-S's and the recently acquired F-4's,
qualitative superiority in aircraft. One should expect to see emphasis
to counter this threat within the South Korean military, the MAAG,
and the U.S. forces. In fact, the extensive Air Defense system in
the south, and the recent transfer of F-4 aircraft from Japan to
South Korea demonstrate this point.
To the limited extent that threat analysis was attempted in this
study, it appears that in terms of North Korea versus South Korea,
the South Korean military has matured into an effective force equal
to the tactics that North Korea has demonstrated and has the potential
of mounting, but that this capability is very sensitive to the duration
of any action and to outside intervention from third parties.
Because of the conditions and problems in the support area, any pro-
tracted operations would be seriously compromised unless there was U.S.
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augmentation and direct support. Although the Nixon Doctrine does
allow for support assistance, the weak support base which exists in
South Korea has a direct effect on the combat effectiveness of the
forces except in short, limited actions such as those in Vietnam and
on the D.M.Z.
It should be emphasized that in discussing the support area the
basic problem is in philosophy rather than mechanics. The support
structure which has been built up over the years is clearly adequate
to sustain the military if it were allowed to operate as designed.
The schools are large enough and cover the range of military skills
adequately. The maintenance depots, and field maintenance organizations
are well manned and organized properly. The supply system is modern,
even automated in some areas, and if time were not a critical factor,
logistics could be managed using the existing networks of roads,
rail, and air transportation. However, each of these cited functions
is hampered and sometimes totally compromised because of the exist-
ing priorities governing the distribution of resources, procurement
policies, and the reliance on U.S. intervention to resolve crisis
situations.
In my opinion the above comments reflect both the strength of the
South Korean MAAG program, and the direction which future management
should be directed in order to fully maximize our investment and efforts.
For this, one should separate the MAAG program into two categories.
The first would include all the unprogrammed, crisis oriented actions
described earlier as our response to the Pueblo incident and other
specific provocations. The second, and that which I feel deserves most
attention, concerns the routine, programmed M.A.P. activities. In
this area several changes could be made which might help to eliminate
the support type problems described in earlier chapters, and which
have direct impact on the ability of the South Korean military to
counter the actual and potential threats.
From my personal experience, and from discussions with several
officers with experience in other MAAG's , the problems in the support
area are not unique to South Korea. This suggests that policy changes
at the highest level are in order. These changes should include
personnel, logistics, supply, procurement, maintenance, and training
policies.
In the personnel area, while the advisory role of the MAAG should
remain dominant, the selection and preparation of personnel for MAAG
assignments should perhaps consider different expertise and skills
than the criteria now in use. It has been demonstrated how diverse
the demands on the advisor are, and how the success of the advisor is
determined by his adaptability and adjustment of these demands.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect greater utility from individuals
who have demonstrated their ability to perform successfully under
these conditions. At present an individual rarely is selected for
more than one MAAG assignment. His experience and potential in
those special areas critical to the advisory role are lost because
of this policy. I feel that many individuals who have found themselves
well adapted to the MAAG mission would welcome the oportunity to
refine their skill by being identified as career Military Advisors.
In this way the particular skill and technique learned in the field
m
,could be utilized in billets created to interface with the overseas
operating locations.
A Military Advisor career field with specified prerequisits required
of applicants, formal training at various levels of management, and the
various other upgrading methods common in other specialized skill areas,
would eliminate the inefficiency which is the result of current
personnel policies.
Supply, maintenance, logistics and procurement could be immeasurably
improved by the simple expedient of using only standard U.S. military
equipment, or only those commerical systems which have been documented
using the standard federal stock number system. This policy would
raise initial investment cost, but this increase would be quickly
amortized through savings in the supply and training areas.
Many of the problems in these areas are also generated by the
practice of maintaining obsolete equipment in the inventory. For
example, the South Korean Air Force maintains a large fleet of
F-86 aircraft. While it can be argued that this aircraft is still
adequate in the close air support role in which they are utilized,
the cost of maintaining these aircraft in operational status is
very high. Because these aircraft have been out of production for
several years, much of the maintenance cost is generated by special
handling and procurement actions required to obtain needed parts.
The cost of these extra efforts, and the delays in returning
equipment to operational ready status which results in a degraded
defense posture, seems out of proportion to the utility of this
particular weapon system. It would be impractical, if not impossible,
to replace all obsolete MAP furnished equipment, however, since the
support problems increase logarithmically as the equipment ages,
setting a mandatory cut off date for U.S. furnished support assistance
for individual weapon systems should be considered. In addition to
halting the support cost spiral, this could allow for more orderly
program management which in turn would preclude the need for emergency
stop-gap procurement which, in the South Korean case, is partially
responsible for the excessive variety of systems in the inventory.
Another departure from current policies which I feel would resolve
some of the problems described would be a major effort to redefine
the goals of a MAP program. Because of the lack of specific goals,
there does not appear to be any beginning or end to various program
elements. For example, in South Korea thousands of personnel have
been trained in U.S. military training centers at the basic skill
level. Yet the system continues to input new students for U.S. basic
training. It is not clear if there is an operational reason that
all basic type training can not be performed in country or if the
practice continues simply because of inertia. There are other
examples of perpetual programs which consume MAP funds at the expense
of resources which are desparately needed for capital investment and
O&M items.
The stop-gap, crisis oriented, procurement practice mentioned
above and earlier, should also be closely re-examined. That there
should be a mechanism to allow for quick response to emergency
situation is vital. But the practice of inputting highly sophisticated
equipment into the South Korean inventory as was the case in the
Pueblo example and others, so disrupts the MAP routine over an extended
period that one wonders if more harm is being done than good. While
one can argue that in a crisis situation the quickest response will
probably be the best, but if the ultimate good of a MAP is the self-
sufficiency of the indigenous military forces, then to periodically
de-stabilize the program by huge, unprogrammed equipment transfers
is surely counter productive. As recommended above, if practical goals
based on a reasonable assessment of a countries capabilities were
used to cevelop the type and extent of a MAP, crisis response could be
managed completely outside the MAP structure. For example, if the
total response to the Pueblo situation would have been exclusively by
U.S. forces; a reaction implemented to meet the crisis, then re-called
when conditions normalized, the South Korean MAP would not be faced with
the type of support problem which limit their effectiveness and them
so dependent on us. On our part, this practice forces us to commit
huge amount yearly simply to protect our investment.
Since most of the logistics problems described in Chapter V result
from problems in the supply and maintenance area, if the above
recommendations were successful, there would be proportional improvement
in logistics.
It seems quite certain that Military Assistance Programs will continue
to be an important facet of our foreign diplomacy. The thrust of the
Nixon Doctrine and our Vietnamization program are recent indicators of
the continuing importance of Military Assistance.
I feel that the South Korean model I have presented in detail offers
a good exapple of a well established Military Assistance Program. On the
W,
one hand South Korea has, in spite of a well demonstrated threat preserved
its security, developed one of the most dramatic economic growth profiles
in the world, built a very impressive and proven military establishments
from very humble beginnings and resources, and has politically stabilized
as demonstrated by the recent elections and their attendant activity.
These developments have certainly been enhanced as a result of the security
provided to a great extent by the South Korean M.A.P.
On the other hand the South Korean M.A.P. has created many problem
situations which clearly limit the return on our investment as well as
the potential effectiveness of the South Korean military.
These problems, duplicated in many of the MAAG missions to which this
country is committed, represent a substantial investment in money, man-
power and effort.
South Korea provides a well defined model from which one may study
programs which produce high returns, as well as those which have limited
or even negative payoffs. I feel that additional research would provide
supportive data which would validate my observations and defend my recommend-
ations. I would also hope that the rather general areas I have defined could
be more clearly detailed and that more specific recommendations might result.
Military Assistance Programs can produce results. There appears to be a
current and continuing need for these programs, and world events and
situations are evolving to which our optimum response may be the establish-
ment of new programs. I feel the South Korean model does provide insights
into what one might expect from Military Assistance programs and techniques,
and that these lessons, if applied, can result in greater add more effective
returns on our investments, enhance our national interest, and be a major
factor in establishing peace.
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